Fantasque Time Line

[Anaxagore]

[Etienne]

[houps]

Bon, V1, je remonte une réponse de Pat' (à charge de Loïc de sépare le sujet) Je m'excuse auprès de l'auteur pour avoir caviardé son texte. En gras, les deuix ou trois points importants - à mon avis - ce qui ne préjuge pas de la valeur du reste :
" ...on reprend la chrono otl qu'on va transposer ftl : 1ers tirs juillet


-dans le nord : en juillet la belgique est en gros libérée : il faut adopter la solution du V1 lancé d'avion, de nuit ? Et la portée du bébé ne va pas lui permettre d'aller trés loin.


-dans le sud : en juillet c'est l'effondrement en Italie, sans parler d'un écart probable dans la finition des installations, et du fait que les terrains corses sont devenus qUasiment vides avec la remontée du front au nord : tout le monde a déménagé sur le continent. meme là il va falloir des he 111 (même en étant aux taquets, la fenêtre pour essayer de lancer qq chose est à tout casser de 7-10 jours)


questions : que reste-t-il aux Allemands en matière de He 111 susceptibles d'emporter l'engin à ce moment là?
quel va être l'attrition de ces unités face à l'effort de chasse de nuit et d'attaque des terrains fourni à ce moment là par les alliés?
enfin, à 5 mois de la fin de la guerre, les Allemands ont ils les moyens de relancer suffisamment la prod de He 111 (au dépends des chasseurs? cf les décisions d'Hitler dans ce domaine) pour maintenir une dispo suffisante?
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Timeo danaos et dona ferentes.
"Les étudiants entrent à l'université persuadés de tout savoir. Ils en ressortent persuadés de ne rien comprendre. Où est passé le savoir ? A l'université, où on le sèche pour l'entreposer et en prendre soin."

[le poireau]

FTL l'unité en charge de ces lancements aéroportés de V1 est le III/KG.3.
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“Il n'y a que deux puissances au monde, le sabre et l'esprit : à la longue, le sabre est toujours vaincu par l'esprit” (Napoléon)

[mikey1983]

[loic]

[Etienne]

Lis mes textes...
Le raid sur Peenemünde, plus précoce, est plus efficace qu'OTL.
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"Arrêtez-les: Ils sont devenus fous!"

[loic]

OK, merci.
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On ne trébuche pas deux fois sur la même pierre (proverbe oriental)
En principe (moi) ...

[mikey1983]

Recently, I acquired the book Building Hitler's Missiles: Traces of History in Peenemünde (by Volkhard Bode and Gerhard Kaiser). While it mainly details the history of the Peenemünde Research Centre, it also contains information about the German preparation and execution of the V-Waffen attacks in 1944-45. The following is from the book and the places and dates are obviously OTL, but I think they provide a useful reference point when considering the V-Waffen and their use in FTL 1944, particularly with the aftermath of a more destructive Operation Hydra and the different situation on the Western Front compared to OTL.


Ready for the Front

"Miracle weapons" in use - 1944 to 1945

Nazi propaganda had been looking for confirmation of the effect of the rocket attacks from the British since June 1944, when the Germans had started long-range bombing of London with the Fi 103 guided missile, the “Vergeltungswaffe V-1”. But as that proved impossible – the British government issued a news blackout so that no newspaper reports came out – Reich Propaganda Minister Goebbels decided to announce the deployment of the V-2 against London himself on 8 November. The first attack had taken place in the night of 7-8 September 1944. The rockets were launched from mobile ramps near St. Vith, south of Aachen, and Wasenaar, near The Hague. The first target areas were Paris and London. By the beginning of November, well over 500 V-2 rockets had been fired at targets in England, France, Belgium and Holland.

As the launch statistics up to 6 November show, six percent of all the rockets still crashed immediately after takeoff, while almost 60 percent were not technically deployable and had to be returned to the Mittelwerk or an interim camp. Only just over a third actually lifted off from the launch platform and entered the planned trajectory.

The first deployment of the V-1 and V-2 “retaliation weapons” had been preceded by a long phase of military and organisational preparation. The most important element was setting up units with special technical training for launching the Fi 103 guided missile and the A-4 rocket.

Both units began their training in Peenemünde. The most important nucleus for the staff of the rocket troops was the Versuchskommando Nord, formed shortly after the outbreak of war. This special technical group was a training ground for both the military leaders of the future launch units and batteries and for the teaching staff at the rocket troops college set up for the A-4/V-2 in Köslin from autumn 1943 onward. Its commander was the Peenemünde Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Stegmaier, who had previously been in charge of the Test Series Works. The first operation units for the guided missile were also set up in Peenemünde from December 1942 onward. The commander of the instruction and experimental troop, which was expanded to form Flakregiment 155 (W) by the end of 1943, was the Luftwaffe officer Max Wachtel. The unit became a division during the course of 1944, with almost 8,000 soldiers.

The launch procedure for the Fi 103/V-1 was trained during 1943, mainly in Peenemünde West and close to the village of Zempin on Usedom. It was only after complicated launching equipment was built on the French coast of the English Channel from January 1944 onward that the new weapon was ready for deployment. However, British intelligence planes had not failed to notice the construction work on the 50-metre launch ramps, and almost all of the 130 launch sites were repeatedly destroyed by air raids up to June 1944.

In the meantime, the operation teams for the A-4/V-2 rocket were being trained at the Instruction and Experimental Battery 444 on the military training grounds near Blizna and in the Tuchola Forest. Major General Walter Dornberger was in charge of assembling and training these technical units. He was also responsible for obtaining the necessary practice rockets and organising fuel, measurement instruments and transport. Thus, Dornberger also took on the function of an inspector for the long-range rocket troops, alongside his position as military head of the rocket development programme. The general was now in charge of comprehensive preparation and securing the materials, technology and personnel for the rockets’ deployment, although not for their use on the front. From December 1943 onward, it was exclusively the Heer that took on this role for the A-4/V-2, while the Luftwaffe was responsible for the Fi 103. In the late autumn of 1944, all “V weapons” units were grouped into the Armeekorps z. b. V. – the “corps for special use” – led by SS Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the Waffen-SS Dr. Hans Kammler from February 1945 onward.

In preparation for deploying the A-4/V-2 against England, the Organisation Todt used thousands of French forced labourers to build two gigantic bunker systems at St. Omer and Wizernes on the north coast of France. Wernher von Braun and other Peenemünder men were involved in selecting the locations and deciding on the basic construction of the bunkers. The army leadership planned to launch some 900 A-4/V-2 long-range rockets per month from these sites, mainly at British cities, from the summer of 1944 onward. Allied pilots repeatedly attacked both the light V-1 facilities and the two giant concrete silos for launching the V-2. Whereas the catapult systems for the guided missile were repaired fairly quickly, the two multi-storey concrete launch sites were rendered useless. Following the bombings, Wernher von Braun and Walter Dornberger finally achieved their original aim of using only mobile launching systems to launch their rockets. The companies Meiller and Vidal had been commissioned to build this type of systems as early as 1942, also enabling the rockets to be transported.

On 16 May 1944, the OKW gave the initial order to start long-range attacks on England in mid-June. The plan of operations involved initially deploying only the Fi 103 guided missile in close succession. Germany’s military and political leaders intended the attacks as “retaliation” for the Allies’ unrestricted superiority in the air, where they could now attack any target on German territory at any time of day or night.

The OKW and the general headquarters set up specifically for deploying the “retaliation weapons” had agreed on a “Y” and an “X” command. The “Y” command was to be given 6 days before the “X” command, to make the rockets ready for firing. The “X” command was the actual order to fire. It could only come into effect in the night from the 6th to the 7th day after “Y” at the earliest. This procedure was necessary as the V-1 guided missile needed complicated technical preparations before it could be fired, which were only carried out at night due to the frequent air raids.

However, the first firing was a complete flop. Only 9 of the 63 guided missiles reported ready to fire actually left the “slingshots”, as the soldiers called the catapult systems, in the night of 12 June 1944. Half of the missiles fell to the ground directly after launching. It was only on 15 June that between 250 and 300 guided missiles were fired.

The location of the concrete launching ramps behind the front lines was determined by the tactical and technical data of the guided missiles. The V-1 had a range of about 230 kilometres. It was launched from a slightly angled 55-metre catapult rail with the aid of a piston, which accelerated the missiles to a takeoff velocity of 320 kilometres per hour using chemically created steam pressure. Once this speed was achieved, the pulsing thrust section fired and took over the propulsion. The V-1 took around 22 minutes to reach its target in London at a speed of 600-650 kilometres per hour. Each of the bombs bore a load of 830 kilograms of explosives. As it was only possible to calculate the point of impact with up to 15 kilometres’ deviation, the targets were not of a precise military nature. Instead, the missile was mainly aimed at densely populated residential areas.

Over 9,300 of these “retaliation weapons” were directed at London and the south of England between June and September 1944. The main firing times were calculated so that the missiles landed in London when most of the inhabitants were on their way to or from work. The aim was to cause fear and panic on the ground. In fact, the V-1 and V-2 did not demoralise the British population, but strengthened their resolve against the German threat. Nevertheless, 1.5 million Londoners were evacuated in the summer of 1944, mainly women and children.

While the Allies had been advancing further into north-western France during the summer months since D-Day on 6 June 1944, the terrible V-1 attacks on London and other targets in the south of England continued. On 2 August 1944, 316 guided missiles left the launching ramps at Pas-de-Calais. One V-1 that landed in East Barnet, North London, on 23 August killed 211 people and injured hundreds more, the highest number of civilian victims to date. The guided missiles were also aimed at military targets, the supply ports of Portsmouth and Southampton.

Churchill’s first reaction to the V-1 in July 1944 was to order the chiefs of staff of the British armed forces to make a “cold-blooded calculation”. He asked them whether it would be worth using poison gas against German industrial centres and cities as a response to the threat to the British population. He received the requested statements by the end of the month. They advised against using mustard gas and other poison gases, partly to avoid hindering the progress of the fast-advancing Allied forces. Instead, the British immediately began constructing a low-lying staggered aerial defence system against the V-1. They set up a cordon of captive balloons and anti-aircraft stations, which fired at the guided missiles from ships and barges in the English Channel. British fighter pilots also quickly developed effective defence tactics. They flew their planes at the same altitude as the missiles, and scooped the bombs out of their trajectory with the pressure of one of their wings, making them crash on open ground. These daring manoeuvres were partly flown by the first British jet planes, the Gloster Meteors, but mainly by Tempests and Spitfires. According to British statistics for the beginning of August, 70 percent of all guided missiles were destroyed by anti-aircraft defences before impact.

Later attempts on the part of the Germans to start the V-1 in the air with the aid of an airplane, so as to get closer to the targets and evade the defence cordon, were not effective, especially as there were no longer nearly enough planes available for this kind of manoeuvre.

Although the V-1 only made a relatively small crater on impact, the considerable shock wave was strong enough to destroy entire building complexes. By the end of September, the V-1 had reduced more than 25,000 buildings in Greater London to rubble. In contrast to air raids by planes, there was no time to raise the alarm between take-off and impact of the V-1. The bomb had already reached its target by the time anyone heard the sound of the engine.

Out of 8,839 Fi 103/V-1 guided missiles launched at London, 2,420 hit densely populated areas. British sources refer to a total of 5,475 deaths and 16,000 injuries.

From autumn 1944 onward, the Wehrmacht started concentrating the V-1 on mainland European targets, as the Allies were steadily advancing, forcing the Germans to withdraw from northern France and Belgium. London was no longer within their range. Up to the Wehrmacht’s final withdrawal, they mainly directed scattered fire at the supply port and the city of Antwerp, and occasionally at massed Allied troops on the advance. The last Fi 103/V-1 guided missile went down over southern England on 29 March 1945, most probably shot from a base in the north of Holland.

The A-4 rocket was only introduced into the “V-weapons” corps in early September 1944. The only available unit for frontline deployment was still Experimental Battery 444. The unit had been expanded into a detachment, now consisting of 9 firing platoons. Major General Dornberger, as inspector of the rocket artillery, ensured that three further artillery detachments were set up with attendant reserve units. Units 863, 971 and 972 were created, with reserve units beyond the Oder River in Schneidemühl, Stolp and Gross-Born. It was not until late autumn 1944, several weeks after the V-2’s first deployment, that the rocket detachments were brought together in a V-Waffen-Division. The division headquarters were in Schwedt on the Oder River. General Dornberger had also set up his headquarters as inspector of the rocket troops in Schwedt. It was here that the entire supply system for deploying the A-4 rocket was organised from early September 1944 onward. The rockets were sent to the troops on the front either directly from the Mittelwerk or from interim camps set up behind the lines. One of these rocket depots was in a system of tunnels in the Ahr Valley near Bonn, where the West German government later set up an emergency underground headquarters in the 1960s. From the Mittelwerk, the A-4 rockets were taken close to the front by train. The rockets from the interim camps were mainly transported on Meiller trailers.

At this point, the A-4/V-2 had a range of 320 kilometres, only slightly above the V-1. The rocket’s load-bearing was not much better either: in September 1944, the V-2 bore about 750 kilograms, but by the end of the year it carried 967 kilograms of explosives after construction improvements. Nevertheless, it was less explosive than the V-1, as the explosion was triggered several metres below ground due to the massive pressure of landing, and the shock wave spread upwards. However, the V-2 was more dangerous due to its inconceivably high speed. The engine stopped firing at around 5,500 kilometres per hour, enabling a flight from a launching station in Holland to central London in just 5 minutes and 20 seconds. There was no way for the British to defend themselves against a projectile that dropped out of the sky so suddenly, almost without a sound. But like the V-1, the V-2 was a relatively imprecise long-range weapon. None of the Peenemünde design engineers’ attempts to raise their rockets’ hit ratio had succeeded. They had to reckon with up to 17 kilometres’ deviation from the assumed target. It was possible to make minor corrections to the course using radio beams, but only in the starting phase of the flight. Both the V-1 and the V-2 were therefore shot according to maps, with no way to establish where they hit. The first V-2 to hit London on 8 September 1944 missed its target, the fire station on Southwark Bridge Road not far from the City, landing a good 10 kilometres to the southwest in a residential area.

The rockets were launched from Meiller trailers, so that their firing position could be altered at any time. The actual launch platform on which the V-2 was brought into a vertical position only needed a firm sand surface for support. The most common choice for launches were forest clearings, which offered camouflage and also protection from strong winds. Each long-range rocket unit consisted of almost 400 officers and soldiers. The platoons and squads were responsible for positioning the rocket for firing, for checking functions, fuelling and approximate target angling. The teams needed about 12 minutes for the final takeoff preparations, including mounting the “payload” with explosives and fuse. They had to fill up the liquid oxygen and the special alcohol mix, the hydrogen superoxide and potassium permanganate during this time. They also had to heat up the main valves and the pumping systems with hot air before the ignition was started from an armoured launch-control car.

On 12 October 1944, Hitler issued orders to direct the V-2 rockets exclusively at London and Antwerp. In London alone, the V-2 killed 2,724 people and severely injured over 6,000. Antwerp suffered 2,229 fatalities and almost 7,000 severe injuries. When a V-2 hit a crowded cinema there on 16 December 1944, 561 people died. Well over 10,000 buildings were destroyed or damaged in Antwerp and the surrounding area.

As of August 1944, the commander for the V-2 deployment was Hans Kammler, as Himmler had been made commander-in-chief of the reserve army after the failed attempt on Hitler’s life of 20 July. On 4 August, Kammler was promoted to the rank of SS Obergruppenführer (general), placing him in charge of decisions on all issues of production and deployment of A-4 rockets on 8 August. This meant an SS general without the necessary technical or military knowledge and experience was now in charge of the “V-Waffen” programme.

On the night of 31 August, shortly before the first deployment, there had been an open confrontation between Kammler and Major General Dornberger at a meeting. Kammler had high-handedly issued instructions on the deployment and supply of the A-4. When Dornberger objected to these instructions, Kammler broke off the meeting. Two days later, written orders arrived from Himmler, stating that Kammler now had exclusive charge of the deployment of all “V-Waffen”. From that point on, the influence of the SS leadership over the former Wehrmacht unit increased steadily, until even parts of the V-1 units were directly integrated into the Waffen-SS in early 1945. The SS hold eventually also had consequences for the staff, as the general headquarters originally set up to take charge of the rocket deployment was finally disbanded in November 1944.

During the final months of 1944 and early 1945, the rocket units were reformed into regiments. The operators of the V-1 guided missile were grouped into the 5th Flak Division. Kammler brought the two different V-1 and V-2 weapons systems back together into a single Armeekorps z. b. V., with his typical combination of craving for complete power and military incompetence. A telegram from Himmler’s staff dated 3 February 1945 ordered: “i commission ss-gruppenführer and lt-general of the waffen-ss dr. kammler with the leadership of the a. k. z. b. v”.

Kammler’s name appears in the Wehrmacht leadership logbook for the last time under the date of 5 April 1945. According to the entry, he had been withdrawing his troops from Holland since 1 April. After that, Kammler was charged with defending the Nordhausen region. Kammler himself, however, had already decided to save his own skin by heading for the Nazi “Alpine fortress” on the Austrian border. From that point on, there is no further evidence of Kammler’s existence. His disappearance remains a mystery to this day. Various witnesses have reported that he was shot by Czech rebels in Prague in May 1945. According to other rumours, he either committed suicide by swallowing cyanide while fleeing from Prague to Pilsen or was shot by an SS man. In a fourth version, Kammler is said to have survived and lived under a false name in an unknown country for some time. None of these rumours can be either disproved or confirmed.

According to British sources, the last deployments of Armeekorps z. b. V. under Kammler’s command were launches of the V-1 against Antwerp on 30 March 1945. The last V-2 landed south of London in Kent on 27 March 1945. As late as two months before the end of the war, eleven V-2s were fired unsuccessfully at the Rhine bridge at Remagen after it had been taken by US troops on 7 March. The “miracle weapon” once again proved to be extremely imprecise in its only use on German territory. Even the closest hit was 1 kilometre away from the bridge.

Recent publications have provided evidence that 21,770 Fi 103/V-1 guided missiles were fired at targets in England and Belgium during the war. 3,225 A-4/V-2 rockets hit the cities of Antwerp (1,610), London (1,359), Lille (25), Paris (19) and Maastricht (19), among other targets.

In total, about every fifth rocket was a dud, mainly as a result of construction defects and sabotage. The German “V-Waffen” killed 8,938 people in Britain and injured 24,524. In Belgium, there were 6,448 dead and 22,524 injured.

In the end, the military outcome of the development of German rocket weapons, bought with the blood of 20,000 prisoners and victims in the resistance and nearly 4.5 billion marks, remained absolutely insignificant for the war.

[mikey1983]

With how the FTL V-1 & V-2 program has been further delayed compared to OTL thanks to a more destructive Hydra, and as the Germans have been expelled from the French and Belgian coasts already by the end of June, it looks to me that the use of the V-1 in FTL will be considerably less destructive compared to OTL, at least where Britain is concerned. The Germans will have to resort to air-lauched V-1 attacks on Britain from the start when the weapons are finally available, whether that is in the end of July or early August. And with how German industry, transport and infrastructure is rapidly falling apart in September, I question whether they will even be able to get the V-2 into military use before everything is over.

[mikey1983]

Having done more digging, and with the TL having progressed the way it has, I think it is safe to say that the only ground-launch positions for the V-1 in the FTL will be in the Netherlands... and perhaps not for very long to begin with. The known OTL V-1 launch sites and locations are as follows:

- Bergen-Westdorp (Bergen, North Holland)
- Castricum (North Holland)
- Heeten (Overijssel)
- Nijreesbos (Almelo, Overijssel)
- Assinkbos (Haaksbergen, Overijssel)
- Warmond (South Holland)
- Joppe (Gelderland - sites along the Dortherdijk and surrounding areas)
- Nijverdal (Overijssel - Launch Site nr. 528)

In addition to the fixed ground ramps, the Luftwaffe used two airbases in the Netherlands to deploy air-launched V-1s. These bases were:

- Gilze-Rijen Airfield (Fliegerhorst Gilze-Rijen), located in North Brabant. Used for air launches until September 15, 1944 OTL. The base served as a major Luftwaffe hub early in the campaign. However, because of the rapid Allied advance through Belgium and the southern Netherlands following Market Garden in September 1944, the operations had to be shifted.

- Venlo Airfield (Fliegerhorst Venlo), located in Limburg, on the German border. Used for air launches starting from the first week of December 1944 through mid-January 1945. Following the loss of bases further west, KG 53 relocated its operations to this base. Fliegerhorst Venlo was one of the largest tactical Luftwaffe airfields in the region. The bombers would take off from Venlo, navigate toward the sea to avoid Allied anti-aircraft infrastructure, and deploy their payloads. The campaign officially ended on January 14, 1945, due to extreme fuel shortages, mounting combat losses, and mechanical malfunctions.

In addition to the Dutch airbases, the Luftwaffe also utilized airfields in Schleswig-Holstein, near the Danish border, to conduct airborne V-1 launches against England in late 1944-early 1945. These airfields included:

- Fliegerhorst Schleswig (Jagel): located near Schleswig, this was a primary hub where the 7. Staffel of KG 53 was stationed to launch V-1 attacks.

- Fliegerhorst Leck: near the Danish border, this base hosted 8. Staffel of KG 53. Missions from Leck required grueling, multi-hour night flights at extremely low altitudes over the sea to avoid radar detection, taking a high toll on the flight crews.

- Fliegerhorst Eggebek: hosted 9. Staffel of KG 53 from October 1944 until mid-February 1945. It was supplemented by a specialized V-1 armorers unit transferred from Oldenburg that had experience from the earlier English Channel campaigns*.

- Fliegerhorst Husum: while not initially a primary squadron base, Husum served as a crucial alternative landing site for returning He 111 bombers when their home bases were heavily targeted by Allied intruders or obscured by poor weather.

As the Dutch ground-launch sites lacked the range to reach Britain**, they would be used exclusively against Belgium, with Antwerp being the main target. This would certainly give the Belgians additional motivation to drive the Germans from the Netherlands - or, to be more diplomatic, assist the Dutch in liberating their homeland.



* As the Pas-de-Calais region was cleared early on by the Allies in the FTL, the unit, if it exists, will obviously be lacking this particular experience.

** OTL, the Germans managed to develop a longer-range variant of the V-1 with which they were able to re-start their ground-launched V-1 campaign against England, but this occurred in March 1945. As the V-Waffen program is already delayed compared to OTL, the longer-range V-1 will not be a factor in the FTL.

[Archibald]

The V-1 warhead was 830 kg of explosives. How much of that can be traded for range ? probably not worth it as obviously it reduce the V-1 destructive power, which was already limited by its atrocious CEP, from memory: 17 km.
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