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La Bataille des îles Russel par Mark Bailey
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patzekiller



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MessagePosté le: Mer Nov 11, 2009 16:16    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

ok, à la suite de cette argumentation et de ces chiffres, je comprends mieux les prises de positions de notre ami australien. Very Happy
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marklbailey



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MessagePosté le: Jeu Nov 12, 2009 11:09    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

I agree.

There is a lot here which is very interesting, even if I only get a general sense of it through babelfish.

I am worried by the diversion between the two teams.

I am very worried by the lack of any European team comment on the English site, and the way in which issues are never finalised, but ignored.

It might not be understood that in the research we are doing, we are finding things nobody else has ever published in English.

I do not think that the value of the large (80-10 page) 'research papers' we have written on the British AViation Industry and Japanse Aviation Industries. They provide a very solid foundation for FFO,are fun to write, and have taught us much about these subjects that we did not know.

An example is how the Japanese deliberately planned and developed a world-class aviation industry from 1922 to 1935 from literally nothing.

This effort was very sophisticated in planning, financing and development - how many people know that the Imperial Japanese Navy had an aircraft factory in 1927: in Copenhagen.

Regards: Mark
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marklbailey



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MessagePosté le: Jeu Nov 12, 2009 22:19    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

C Caverne:

You are correct. The communications problem is our largest problem. I will try to make an effort to post more here. It will be in English, as I cannot speak French – my apologies.

Can I suggest that people also post on the English site, in French? Even if we are forced to use babelfish translation, we can get the general sense of what is written.

Thank you for the good wishes regarding the floods. None of our ‘team’ is affected. Australia is a strange place. While some parts have floods, here in Canberra we are in the second decade of a drought. It started in the early 1990s. Not unusual by Australian standards, but it is starting to become annoying.

What is really worrying people is the summer fire season. Several towns were destroyed and hundreds of people died last summer in bush fires. The predictions for this year are worse, especially in Victoria, where Shane lives.

Regards: Mark
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Capitaine caverne



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MessagePosté le: Ven Nov 13, 2009 09:53    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

marklbailey a écrit:

Can I suggest that people also post on the English site, in French? Even if we are forced to use babelfish translation, we can get the general sense of what is written.


Ok pour moi, je veut bien donner l'exemple et apporter ma contribution en postant de temps en temps sur la FFO. L'utilisation de Babelfish sera nécessaire, car si je parviens à lire les textes en anglais assez facilement, je suis assez mauvais pour rédiger un texte et ne pourrait poster qu'en Français.

Comment s'inscrire sur le forum FFO Mark?
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le roi louis



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MessagePosté le: Ven Nov 13, 2009 14:07    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

Même remarque que Cap'taine.
Je lit (laborieusement) l'anglais mais le parle très mal et je n'évoque même pas de l'écrit. Embarassed
C'est un sacré problème de communication et de cohérence entre les deux équipes que soulève ce débat. (je sais, j'enfonce des portes ouvertes en écrivant cela)
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Alias



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MessagePosté le: Ven Nov 13, 2009 14:44    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

C'est quelque chose que je ferais volontiers (je gère plutôt bien l'anglais lu, écrit et même parlé), mais j'ai un peu peur du temps nécessaire pour faire ça bien.

C'est quoi le volume de débats sur FFO?

--

I'd be willing to liaise between the boards; I'm used to read, write and even speak in English, but I'm a bit scared by the time required to do this properly.

Can you give me an idea on the volume of posts on FFO?
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Capitaine caverne



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MessagePosté le: Ven Nov 13, 2009 17:42    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

Alias a écrit:

C'est quoi le volume de débats sur FFO?


C'est un peu comme ici, avec des moment de calme plat et d'autres ou c'est l'affluence. Mais ce sont surtout des spécialistes des post énormes avec beaucoup de texte et beaucoup de commentaires.
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marklbailey



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MessagePosté le: Dim Nov 15, 2009 07:31    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

I have sent a message to Shane Rogers asking him to putin this thread a description of how to log on to his English language board.

He can be emailed at:

argus303

@

tpg.com.au

Just remove the breaks from that address. I have broken it up to avoid the spammers.



The volume of posts there is not large, it is quiet for a time, then there will be activity.

Captain Caverne's point about very large posts is correct. Some of the posts are big.

This is because we do a lot of research, and post the results of that.

Regards: Mark
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marklbailey



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MessagePosté le: Dim Nov 15, 2009 07:43    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

Just to further explain the effect of France Fighting on. Shane (Argus) made this comment on NFB.

What is fascinating about this project is the impact of Frnce fighting on 'broken backed'.

The real impact of this is in logistics. Who would expect that France fighting on would result in no effective lend-lease for the USSR?

But that has happened.

Shane said:

Just working through the seemingly obvious point of adding France to the effective strength of the allies in 40-42 has been a real eye opener. It looks obvious, more = more and that = better. But at the brass tacks level we find the French contribution in manpower, strategic options and political capitol, come at a cost in time (driven by the imperative to liberate France soonest) and materiel; and that in some respects the cost outweighs the benefit, even before looking into the potential outcomes of that new situation on the course of events.

Whatever your personal view on the the historical case for/against a '43 invasion and how the US was manipulated by those pesky Brits, a 44 invasion at least allowed the allies time to build up forces in the UK at a rate that permitted some serious diversions into other areas (like the Pacific and supporting Russia). A '43 time table alone would have forced some drastic relocation of resources from OTL, but then equipping and supporting a sizable French contribution at the same time really throws a fox into the chicken coop, even before adding in any additional diversions. France can not help but be a net drain on US/UK industrial/economic power, for all she does provide a number of very useful compensations too. Any proposed outcomes from this in FFO are purely speculative of course, but just comparing the possible options available to the historical players against the proposed and eventual courses of action they took has been fascinating. There's a few long standing 'Why didn't they try X" questions that have been rolling about for years we have a new perspective on.

From the research angle I think the real value of FFO as a framework for delving below the headlines into the nitty gritty of WWII, is its subtlety. A France fighting on broken backed is substantial enough to cross all boundaries and influence the whole war, but only in detail. Pull any of the other major powers out of the historical course of events and the changes are gross, France is big enough to force change, yet small enough to leave no clear planes of divergence. To get any coherent picture the details can't be glossed over to any where near the same extent usual in most alt-histories, and this extends well beyond anything to do with France as France. The state of rail communications in French North Africa is actually a critical point, but then so is port capacity in the UK and the geography of Burma. Just like the real thing - it is all important.

shane


Regards: Mark
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Capitaine caverne



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MessagePosté le: Dim Nov 15, 2009 10:11    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

Je me suis décidé et j'ai envoyé un mail à Shane Rogers/Argus pour pouvoir m'inscrire sur la FFO. J'ai pris le risque de me fendre d'un mail dans mon meilleur anglais, assisté par monsieur Harrap's. Je pense qu'il ne devrait pas avoir de mal à me comprendre (Espérons-le). Etant donné qu'il vit aux antipodes, il doit dormir à cette heure et la réponse devrait arriver sous 24 heures. Après cela, je vous ferais un message expliquant la procédure à suivre pour s'inscrire sur la FFO, ca évitera d'envoyer des dizaines de mail à Shane/Argus.
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loic
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MessagePosté le: Dim Nov 15, 2009 11:54    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

Je ne peux qu'encourager les membres de ce forum à contribuer au forum FFO. Néanmoins, il faut savoir qu'il existe une différence d'appréciation que nous n'arrivons pas à résoudre. Pour le moment, la question est mise entre parenthèses, du fait du travail sur le livre.
Nos amis anglo-saxons sous-estiment la contribution française à l'accélération de l'économie de guerre US qui en OTL a subi un coup de frein avec de l'Armistice (avec probablement aussi un effet de bord côté britannique avec la bataille d'Angleterre). Voir la section arguments du site.
Par ailleurs, les progrès que l'Union Soviétique peut réaliser avec le délai d'un an du au report de Barbarossa sont également sous-estimés. Sans vouloir soulever de polémique ici, les anglo-saxons ont un regard "orienté" sur l'Union Soviétique.
C'est tout pour moi, je ne peux pas consacrer de temps à un débat.

I can only encourage members of this forum to contribute to the FFO forum. However, be aware that there is a difference of appreciation that we can not solve. For now, the matter is in brackets, because of the work on the book.
Our Anglo-Saxon friends underestimate the French contribution to the U.S. war economy acceleration that OTL suffered a slow-down with the Armistice (with also a probable effect on the British side with the Battle of Britain). See on the arguments section on the website.
Moreover, the progress that Soviet Union can achieve with the one year postponement of Barbarossa are also underestimated. Without the intention to raise controversy here, the Anglo-Saxons have a "particular" opinion on Soviet Union.
That's all for me, I haven't the time to debate.

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marklbailey



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MessagePosté le: Dim Nov 15, 2009 13:39    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

Thank you Loic for pointing this article out to me. I have translated it and posted it with comments on the English board, for the attention of the US team members.

The assumptions in this modelling seem to my research to be questionable - they need validating. The US team members should be able to assist, as they are more expert on these matters than I.

The assumption of the use of all 4,000,000 grt of French shipping is simply not correct. Only about 2,000,000 grt of this shipping can be used on trans-Atlatic trades, leaving 1,000,000 grt for French Colonial use globally. Study of French merchant shipping losses in OTL indicates that most of the best French merchant ships, about 1,000,000 grt, will be lost (most of this is OTL historical anyway).

French North Africa requires about 4,000,000 grt of shipping to support, given the scale of what you are doing there. Half of this will have to come from the British pool, or by purchase from the USA.

We now from OTL that developing and maintaining 4 French infantry Divisions in 1943 demanded 120,000 tons of equipment in the first case, plus 25,000 tons per month afterwards. this is 20 ships plus 5 per month (dry cargo only, no fuel is included) for each 4 infantry divisions.

As can be seen, the tonnage demands of just the Army are enormous. Adding the civilian economy and a large air force makes them much larger. Where are the ships coming from?

With one serious error in this modelling, the rest has to be validated.

Regards: Mark



The following has been published on the French language site. It models very large increases in US arms production in June-July 1940 (28.75% increase) and 41 (30-40% increase). The underlying logic seems reaonable. However, I have serious doubts about the validity of the modelling. It is not known if British assumption of responsibility for French orders has been included in this modelling.
The assumption that more money plus existing plant plus lots of unemployed personnel equals huge production increases seems to be simplistic.

I think the production increases to be too large, and the modelling too simple. However, I am happy to be convinced othrwise.

Regards: Mark


FFO French Site



US Industry.



Preamble:

The United States is often seen like a "super-power" of armament. [This] is very exactly the real situation. The unemployed industrial capacities in the USA are important into 39/40 (unemployment strongly increased into 39 compared to 1937). Roosevelt makes the choice [to] serve [as the] arsenal for France and GB. These two countries pay not only [for] the material, but also [for the] expansion of the factories.



They take care of the delivery of the materials ("Cash and Carry"). Taking into account day's work in the American industry in spring 40, one could double the production into 2 or 3 weeks (one second team) on the condition of paying the overcost (10% on the wages) and [for the replacement of] obsolete the machine tools.



Within sight of the number of unemployed in the skilled workers (statistical US of 40) it n' there no impossibility, even minor has.

(Sentence meaning unclear)



What slows down US industrial rise to power in second half of 40 compared to the initial forecasts, is that GB only finds itself to pay and that [there was a shortage of shipping] to transport the material. If France remained in war, it pays and it provides the ships (4 million register tons…). All models of logistics " tendus" show an enormous sensitivity for purposes of margin (2% to 3%). Here one is to at least 10% in term of tonnage.



Comment by Mark: The assumption that all 4,000,000 GRT of French shipping would be available to the Allied war effort is not correct. Firstly, only a proportion of this shipping is suitable as much of the French merchant fleet was short-sea shipping, or dedicated to supporting colonial activities. Secondly, losses among French shipping would be about 25% of the total, including many of the best ships (See Jordan, The World’s Merchant Ships, 1939, for the devastation wrought among the French merchant marine in 1939-40). Thirdly, with French participation post June 1940 comes a demand for additional tonnage on top of what France has available. France continuing in the war actually demands additional tonnage from the British pool.


Sources :

Alan S. Milward "War, Economy and Society 1939-1945", University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979.

R. Elberton Smith, "The Army and Economic Mobilization", Center of Military History - US Army, Washington, DC. 1985 (re-édition d'un ouvrage de 1957 qui est l'histoire de la mobilisation industrielle à partir des archives et des documents officiels).



Total American production related to the war of July 1, 1940 to August 31, 1945, calculated of billion dollars at the prices of 1945, s' establishes with:



Tableau n°1


1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945

total
3,6
17,8
57,4
86,2
93,4
57,4

dont







War Department (armée et aviation)
1,7
9,7
33,6
49,0
52,5
33,4

Marine
0,8
4,0
12,7
22,0
27,0
17,4

Commission Maritime et administration navale
0,1
0,6
3,1
6,5
7,2
3,7

Commandes étrangères et Lend-Lease
1,0
3,5
8,0
8,7
6,7
2,9


(R. Elberton Smith, p. 6)



If one now considers the public investments (including those devoted to purchase of the grounds and the buildings), one obtains the following figures:



Tableau n°3


1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945

total
0,8
4,9
12,7
8,5
2,9
1,6

dont







War Department (armée et aviation)
0,4
2,7
6,5
2,5
0,7
0,6

Marine
0,1
0,8
2,4
1,7
0,8
0,5

Commission Maritime et administration navale
x
0,1
0,3
0,1
x
x

Commandes étrangères et Lend-Lease
0,3
1,3
3,5
4,2
1,4
0,5


(R. Elberton Smith, p. 6)
x = sommes inférieures à 50 millions de dollars



Two observations impose. D' a share, historically, l' year 1941 is remembered by l' d' equivalent; a doubling compared to the production of 1940, if one deduces this one from the production of the second half-year. In fact, first half of the year was lower than the second. The production knows then more a tripling between 1941 and 1942.



US industry is thus far to be in 1940 with its maximum of time of peace. The second [consideration] relates to the impact of the British orders (like those of Holland and Norway). For the second half-year of 1940, these foreign orders account for 42.8% of acquisitions of l' Army and of the Navy American (600 million dollars against 1400 million). In the same way, the overseas investments accounted for 60% of the investments of Army and of the Navy of the United States. The potential impact of foreign orders and d' overseas investments on the industrial sector of the defence is thus very high. The leverage action seems considerable.



Comment by Mark: There are two assumptions here which require research and validation. Firstly, the USA was not ‘at a maximum time of peace’ in 1940. It was in the middle of a massive rearmament program which had commenced in the 1930s. Secondly, what was being sold was equipment mostly already in production. Armaments production lags investment by 12-18 months. Therefore, the assumption here that US production increases 1940-41 is very doubtful. At the least, this has to be proven by analysis of investment in industry, who made it, when, and why.


A French government remaining in the conflict at June 20, 1940 would have continued to spend in the United States within the framework of acquisitions (table n°2) as in that of the investments (table n°3). If l' it is estimated, in a very careful way very, that the French expenditure for second half-year 1940 would have been equal to 66,6% of the amount of the total foreign expenditure in investment and undoubtedly to the equivalent of the total in acquisition (that is to say 200 + 600 = 800 million dollars), one then obtains an increase in the total request of 28,5% and 25% for the investments. The impact of France would thus have been felt at the same time on the request and l' offer. The American industrial instrument could have answered this additional request rather quickly, because it n' was by no means materially limited to l' time. The analysis given by R. Elberton Smith is very clear. Considering the acceleration of the military orders at July 1, 1940, he writes existed with the time: "tremendous tank off idle manpower and industrial capacity" has; , making possible a rise of production without resorting to a total industrial mobilization (p.85).



Comment: This is plausible, but it has to be quantified. Currently, the assumption here is not proven.


Alan Milward (p.65) indicates that the average weekly duration use of the industrial plants in American industry is of 40h in second half of 1940, whereas 8.7 million unemployed is counted. Considering the acceleration of the production in 1941, he writes: "This would suggest that taking up the slack which existed in the economy was the responsible factor for establishing has spleen off growth off industrial output which was subsequently sustained by transfers off resources and increased productivity." (p.66).



This intermediate duration; use will reach 90h per week in 1944 (with use of the system 2x8 or 3x7). If account of the French orders is taken and of the direct investments and induced in the second half-year 1940, the alternative scenario would have avoided with American industrial effort the problems he historically knew in the summer and autumn 1940 (R. Elberton Smith): " In the summer and fall off 1940, when major segments off the defence program were temporarily stalled over the problem off facility expansion, the NDAC sought has method off reimbursing contractors for to their emergency capital outlays." (p. 476).



The fact that financial problems relating to l' increase in production capacities (facility expansion) sufficient to compromise major segments of the program of defence appear with l' summer and l' autumn 40 is clearly related to the disappearance of the French expenditure, which was important in 1939 and in the first six-month period 1940.



Comment: Is this actually so? After all, Britain took over the French orders, and kept paying. Has this been factored in, or is this another assumption?


We mentioned the question; a possible increase in the American military production in second half-year 40 with colleagues who are American military historians and logisticians and their answer is always: in the historical context, for political reasons and economic (money for the orders) what was fact is the maximum, but, if one includes the radical change of the maintenance of France in the war, of the political impact on Roosevelt, and if Lend-Lease [?] is included; economic impact of French money, a rise in production simply by lengthening of the working time or passage to the 2x8 is perfectly possible. If this expenditure is restored, then the evoked difficulties disappear and the rate/rhythm of progression of the American military production accelerates significantly compared to historical reality. The maintenance of an elevated level of expenditure would quickly have exhausted French finances, returning in any case the passage to the obligatory Lease-lend in March 1941, as this was the case historically.



Comment: This is a logical argument – but the figures are missing. We need to know the figures: what was the ‘missing expenditure’ bearing in mind the British taking over many French orders? This will give us the actual effect, rather than the assumed effect. As it is, the assumed affect looks to be exaggerated.


In conclusion, the following elements can be regarded as benchmarks beyond any discussion:

(a) American industry is very far from working with full capacity. Its unemployed capacities are considerable and justify the assumption of a rise to power faster than in our historical screen.

(b) American industry saw its rate/rhythm of development in the sector of defence slowed down because of the French armistice. This obliged the US government to take inciting tax measures, which however were not effective before the beginning of 1941. The constraint on the American productive apparatus in 1940 is financial and nonmaterial.

(c) The continuation of expenditure French consequent, but compatible with financial means at the disposal of the government folded up on Algiers, would certainly have involved an acceleration d' at least 28.75% of the American production in the military field for the second half-year of 1940 and undoubtedly from 30 to 40% for the year 1941. The situation would thus have been, for the second half-year of 1940 and 1941, the following one with regard to the d' production; armaments by l' American industry (figures of billion dollars at the prices of 1945):



Tableau n°4


1940
Alt-1940
1941
Alt-1941



total
2,1
2,7
8,6
11,6



dont







War Department (armée et aviation)
0,9
0,9
4,8
4,8



Marine
0,5
0,5
2,3
2,3



Commission Maritime
et administration navale
0,1
0,1
0,5
0,5



Commandes étrangères
et Lend-Lease
0,6
1,2
1,0
4,0






In conclusion, an extra effort of the American productive apparatus, in order to after June 25, 1940 support a French presence in the conflict, is entirely field of possible and perfectly compatible with what we know of dynamic industrial of the period. Together technical data as for the work conditions and with the reaction of the industrial tools, validated by discussions with specialists d' industrial saving in this period, show a rapid LIMITED rise to power is entirely possible, without additional investment. The effect; drive induced by the maintenance of French expenditure in the United States during the second half-year 1941 would have caused an acceleration of the rate/rhythm of industrial mobilization in 1941 and undoubtedly in 1942.



Comment: This is again assumed, not proven. The idea of US industrial output rising by 28.75% in Jul-Dec 1940 and by 30-40% in 1941 without any additional investment [in new plant?] is remarkable.

Remarkable claims do have to be proved.

It is not proven that additional money plus lots of unemployed equals output to the large amount claimed, especially when we know that in reality, the British took over many of the French orders. Has this been factored in already? Because if it has not, then this model of increased US production is not valid.
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Casus Frankie
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MessagePosté le: Dim Nov 15, 2009 15:21    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

It is not proven that additional money plus lots of unemployed equals output to the large amount claimed, especially when we know that in reality, the British took over many of the French orders. Has this been factored in already? Because if it has not, then this model of increased US production is not valid.

This HAS been factored.

MORE IMPORTANT :
Mark, did you receive the message Jacques sent you 2 weeks ago (and again last week) ?

Frank
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marklbailey



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MessagePosté le: Lun Nov 16, 2009 04:09    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

No, Frank, I have received no messages from Jacques.

My old computer at home has died, so I have taken the opportunity to also change over my service provider. I am not yet back up on line with a new email address.

A work address is:

mark.bailey

@

defence.gov.au

(with the gaps removed, of course)

An alternative is to send it via Shane.

ON the economic modelling: I'm glad that was factored in, it was not obvious from the babelfish translation, which as we know only allows the broad outline to be understood. And even that is not very good.

I'd be interested in the planned French purchases in OTL from the USA, haveing never seen such information in English scholarship.

Regards: Mark
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ladc51



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MessagePosté le: Lun Nov 16, 2009 08:56    Sujet du message: Répondre en citant

Hello Mark,

I am surprised that you never saw the planned French purchases in OTL from the USA in English scholarship.

I found all the interesting information in the following english book :
Air Arsenal North America. Aircraft for the allies 1938-1945, purchases and lend-lease. Phil Butler with Dan Hagedorn. Midland Publishing.

All the figures used in FFO for french orders or letters of intent before POD are coherent with figures from this book (at least, everytime I checked...).
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