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Joukov6
Inscrit le: 29 Mar 2010
Messages: 419
Localisation: Lyon
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 Posté le: Lun Aoû 09, 2010 17:16 Sujet du message: |
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Ouais enfin y a pas que le parachute, il s'agit d'un tout lié à la philosophie japonaise où visiblement on est dans un monde binaire, ou on rentre vainqueur et indemne ou on ne rentre pas du tout. Un as japonais et commandant d'escadrille qui avait vu son appareil endommagé, mais qui aurait eu une chance de rentrer à la base, a préféré s'écraser sur une base alliée plutôt que de tenter de rentrer et de risquer de devoir s'éjecter sur le chemin. Un autre pilote japonais qui avait été porté disparus, ou mort, avait en fait préféré s'éjecter et s'était fait capturé. Lorsqu'il est revenus au Japon il a changé de nom et démarré une nouvelle vie, ne pouvant supporter cette "honte".
De toutes façons le "paquetage" du pilote japonais qui s'éjecte se résume à un pistolet, bien plus là pour se suicider qu'autre chose, là où un soldat allié dispose de toute une panoplie (tente, canot de sauvetage, nourriture, eau, fusée de détresse, ...) ainsi qu'unités d'hydravions spécialement entraînées pour les récupérer.
Sans oublier l'optique du chasseur ultra-léger choisie par l'aviation japonaise, qui lui a certes permis d'obtenir des avions agiles et endurants, mais en contrepartie ils sont excessivement vulnérables. Or en y ajoutant réservoir auto-obturant, radio, parachute, ... les avions deviennent moins agiles et donc plus vulnérables.
L'hémoragie de pilotes que subis l'aviation japonaise est du à une philosophie datant de bien avant la guerre, la FTL ne peut pas modifier cela.
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marklbailey
Inscrit le: 05 Jan 2008
Messages: 121
Localisation: Canberra, Australia
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| Posté le: Mar Aoû 10, 2010 09:06 Sujet du message: |
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Joukov6
Perhaps the automatic translation causes me to misunderstand what you say.
If you are suggesting that the Japanese Air Forces did not use parachutes, you are mistaken.
They were standard equipment and were routinely used for the same reasons everyone else used them. Japanese aircrew could and did nurse badly damaged aircraft back over their own lines or back over their own bases and then bale out. Aircraft did suffer fatal mechanical problems in flight.
After the carriers were lost at Midway, for example, the torpedo bombers and dive bombers that were in the air orbited destroyers, and baled out to be picked up. The fighter pilots ditched, because in the A6M2 wearing the parachute was very uncomfortable, so the pilots used them as cushions! See Saburo Sakai in his book 'Samurai' for a description of this.
The IJNAF routinely ran air-sea rescue services, using floatplanes and flying boats.
Japanese aircraft were not significantly more fragile or inflammable than anyone else's aircraft of the same period in time. remember that A6M2, for example, entered service in mid 1940. Many nations started their war without self-sealing tanks or much armour in their aircraft.
Japanese aircraft of the 1944-45 period were as strongly built and heavily armoured as US aircraft of the same types. See the technical evaluations conducted by Allied Technical Intelligence organisations 1944-45.
However, in 1944-45 armour and self-sealing did not have much value. Both the USN and IJNAF, for example, were using 12.7mm and 20mm guns as standard in their aircraft.
There are many 'popular myths' about the Japanese. Most of them are just that, myths.
Regards: Mark |
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delta force
Inscrit le: 07 Juin 2009
Messages: 580
Localisation: france Gironde
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| Posté le: Ven Aoû 13, 2010 09:45 Sujet du message: |
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la production aérienne japonaise est impressionnante aussi bien OTL que FTL mais dans les deux cas le problème majeur pour le Japon est la mise en œuvre de ce matériel et ce qui revient à
- assurer et développer la production de carburant : ce qui veut dire des raffineries si possible près des zones d'opérations (quid de l'état des installations aux Indes néerlandaises? de mémoire OTL elles n'ont pas ou peu été remises en état par les japonais, FTL cela ne devrait pas être différent) , et avoir suffisamment de pétroliers pour transporter tout cela ( à ce sujet même si l'IJN FTL est plus efficace en lutte ASM , il manque déjà du tonnage au 7 décembre 1941 pour couvrir tous les besoins de transport, j'ai lu quelque part que la flotte marchande japonaise ne couvre à cette époque que 70% du trafic maritime nippon au déclenchement de la guerre),
- transporter les avions vers les théâtres d'opération soit par convoyage aérien (il faut une certaine masse de pilotes) soit par mer (ce qui impose d'avoir des capacités de transport on en revient toujours là),
- enfin avoir suffisamment de pilotes entrainés donc du carburant en conséquence.
Comme pour la Luftwaffe le manque de carburant est le goulot d"étranglement majeur.
Pour l'appareil productif - comme en OTL - des tensions sur la main d'œuvre notamment qualifiées sont à prévoir.
Ne pas oublier non plus qu'en FTL la situation en Chine est plus difficile pour la Japon et oblige sans aucun doute des moyens supérieurs notamment aériens (déjà OTL la majeure partie de l'armée est en Chine)
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marklbailey
Inscrit le: 05 Jan 2008
Messages: 121
Localisation: Canberra, Australia
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| Posté le: Sam Aoû 14, 2010 06:30 Sujet du message: |
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Delta Force
Ensure the production and Developer of fuel , if possible Meaning Refineries near the area of operations (what the state of facilities in the Netherlands Indies ? Memory OTL THEY Have Been Little Golden rehabilitated by Japanese , FTL this "should not Be different) , and oil Enough to carry it all ( this matter is IJN Even If FTL is more effective ASW IS Already short of tonnage at December 7 , 1941 to cover all Transportation Needs, I read somewhere the Japanese merchant fleet That Does this Time That Has 70% of maritime traffic Outbreak of War in Nippon )
In 'old FFO' teh japanese occuopied teh Kuching area very quickly, before demolitions could occur. This is the same as OTL.
They then based most of the 2nd Fleet in Kuching for most of 1942. THis would guarantee that the refineries there would be in service very quickly.
In December 1941, 85% of Japan's large fleet of big, fast, modern motor tankers was idle. The tankers exist to immediately organise several Yusosen Butai (an innovative Japanese concept like a 'standing convoy') to bring this oil back to Japan, especially the semi-refined waste product (petrols, ethanes, diesels) which these refineries burned off.
These refineries fed the ship bunker fuel trades, so about 60% of teh crude was burned off as waste. There was no market for petrol or diesel from these refineries.
The Palembang refinery (captured intact and fully operational in FTL as it was in OTL) supplied the whole region's demands for petrols and aviation fuels.
The demolitions at Tarakan and Balikpapan were as per OTL. The Dutch lightly damaged the refineries and other facilities there, expecting they would be back in 3-6 months.
The Borneo and Sumatran oilfields were all taken intact in OTL and FTL and APOD. They can supply 150%-200% of Japanese demand.
At the same time in FTL and APOD, the Japanese are forced to base a major fleet at Kuching. This will force them to fuel that fleet from the refineries there. Even capital ships can berth at the refinery to refuel. In turn, this will force them to use their idle tanker tonnage in Yusosen Butai to ship the excess production abck to Japan.
In FTL and APOD, Japan's fuel import problems are solved by force of curcumstances.
Regards: Mark |
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patzekiller
Inscrit le: 17 Oct 2006
Messages: 3958
Localisation: I'am back
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| Posté le: Sam Aoû 14, 2010 06:57 Sujet du message: |
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mark,
maintenant que les raids (à moitié reussis) sur les raffineries du sud et la campagne sous marine dans ce secteur ont été proposés, quel va etre l'impact sur 43
la route petroliere va elle etre recentrée sur la partie nord?
des renforts vont ils etre envoyés dans ce secteurs et pour la protection des passes notamment?
ces renforts vont ils soulager guadalcanal?
je pense que ces eventuels renforts, sans doute specialisés dans la lutte ASW (DD, hydravions) devraient avoir 2 consequences :
les flottes operant dans le pacifique sud devraient devenir "macrocephales" et qu'alors, un effort de ciblage en 43 sur les petites unités aura alors un impact sur l'IJN.
le renforcement de la lutte ASW au centre allegera la pression en peripherie. les operations sous marines alliées devraient devenir plus faciles et subir moins de pertes.
si ces hypotheses sont vraies peut on envisager en étape suivante un veritable blocus sous marin d'un secteur en peripherie, soit pour appuyer un debarquement ulterieur , soit en diversion d'autres operations.
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marklbailey
Inscrit le: 05 Jan 2008
Messages: 121
Localisation: Canberra, Australia
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| Posté le: Sam Aoû 14, 2010 09:01 Sujet du message: |
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| Citation: | | Now that the raids (half successful conventions) on refineries in the south and the countryside underwater in this sector have been proposed, what will the impact be on 43 |
If these are the FTL raids, then the impact should not be large. There is more refinery capability than there is tanker capacity. Yet, the Japanese tanker capacity (fast ones in Yusosen Butai and the slower ones in convoy) is more than enough to fill all Japan's storage capacity.
Worse for the Allies, the Japanese do not need all the captured refinereies except Palembang.
What they need is the crude oil. Their domestic oil refinery capability is more than enough for their needs.
So attacking the captured refineries does little. it is destroying spare capacity. The ability of the Japanese to export crude oil has not been affected.
| Citation: | | la route petroliere va elle etre recentrée sur la partie nord? the petroleum road it will be refocused on the north? |
The main eastern route will still be Makassar Strait -Palawan Passage, the main western route will still be Karimata Strait-Kuching-(meet eastern route at Palawan passage) - Luzon Strait - Ryukyus - Bungo Suido. These routes are under air cover all the way.
| Citation: | | des renforts vont ils etre envoyés dans ce secteurs et pour la protection des passes notamment? reinforcements they will be sent in this sector and for the protection of such passes? |
The Japanese in 'old FTL' and APOD were forced by MN and RN submarine strength to implement their OTL 1934-39 plans to mass produce escorts (kaibokan) and merchant ships in early 1942. These escorts and merchant ships will reinforce their entire convoy system quite quickly. The major escort reinforcements sent to the 'chokepoints' will be aircraft (especially the H9A1/H9A2 which Jacques has made a standard IJNAF anti-submarine type). These aircraft will make life extremely hard for the USN submarine force and cause them heavy losses. The H9A has excess load capacity and a large cabin, so it can be fitted with BOTH radar and the Japanese magnetic anomaly detector.
| Citation: | | ces renforts vont ils soulager guadalcanal? These reinforcements will help relieve Guadalcanal? |
Translation error? I do not understand the question.
| Citation: | je pense que ces eventuels renforts, sans doute specialisés dans la lutte ASW (DD, hydravions) devraient avoir 2 consequences : I think the eventual reinforcements, probably specialized in the fight ASW (SD, seaplanes) should have two consequences:
les flottes operant dans le pacifique sud devraient devenir "macrocephales" et qu'alors, un effort de ciblage en 43 sur les petites unités aura alors un impact sur l'IJN. fleets operating in the South Pacific should become "macrocephalic" and then, an effort targeting 43 on small units will have an impact on the IJN. |
Translation error? I do not understand the question. What do you mean by the term "macrocephalic"?
| Citation: | | le renforcement de la lutte ASW au centre allegera la pression en peripherie. strengthening the fight ASW center will alleviate the pressure in the periphery. |
The opposite will occur. Perhaps the nature of the Japanese convoy system is not known? There is no 'centre' and there is no 'periphery'. There is a NETWORK.
See the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 'The War Against Japanese transportation 1941-1945". You can download a copy HERE: http://www.archive.org/details/waragainstjapane54unit
See p.50 for the Japanese convoy routes.
Close study of the map series showing Japanese merchant losses month by month from p.45 onwards is very interesting. It shows how ineffective the USN submarine force was until 1943, when the japanese were not convoying very much (they just had no real need) AND the USN was using signals intelligence to obtain intercepts on these unescorted merchant ships!
The convoy system is a series of approved routes under air cover in the western pacific, East China Sea, South China Sea and Java Sea. In the Pacific, the convoys literally cannot be found without ULTRA and MAGIC. This is clear from remaining Seventh Fleet Intelligence Reports. In FTL, the loss of Prince of Wales as done by the European Team means that the Japanese will know their codes are being broken.
If they cannot find convoys in the 20,000,000 square nautical miles of open Pacific, then US submarines must get close to their destinations and operate where Japanese anti-submarine forces are strongest. They will suffer very heavy losses under these circumstances.
| Citation: | | les operations sous marines alliées devraient devenir plus faciles et subir moins de pertes. operations under the allied navies should become easier and suffer fewer losses |
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Not really clear from teh translation. If you mean that JAPANESE operations will become easier and they will suffer fewer losses, youa re correct. if you are using the periphery-centre model, then no - because the model is not valid, as the USSBS Report shows.
| Citation: | | si ces hypotheses sont vraies peut on envisager en étape suivante un veritable blocus sous marin d'un secteur en peripherie, soit pour appuyer un debarquement ulterieur , soit en diversion d'autres operations. If these hypotheses are true we can consider next step in a real submarine blockade of an area on the outskirts or to support a subsequent landing, or in other diversionary operations. |
The periphery-centre model is NOT valid, as the source used shows. Efforts to blockade using submarines will result in extremely heavy Allied submarine losses, becasue they have no choice but to operate in the chokepoints.
As you can see in Franklin (George Franklin, Britain's Anti-Submarine Capability 1919-1939, Frank Cass, London 2003, pp.165-171), the news is all bad for the Allies.
From 3 September 1939 to 31 may 1940, German U-boats attacked 10 escorted convoys. They sank 11 merchant ships. The escorts sank 2 U-boats and damaged another. That is a ratio of 5.5:1.
In 1942, Japanese anti-submarine technology, weapons and tactics were about equal to RN technology and tactics (but not weapons). However, USN submarines are larger and clumsier underwater than German U-boats.
In FTL and APOD, the Japanese can convoy EVERY large merchant ship outside home waters by late 1942. And they will be under air cover everywhere, except on teh long-haul legs in teh open pacific - where (without signals intelligence) they cannot be found.
The result is inevitable. The USN submarine offensive will be completely defeated by July 1943. It will be defeated because their submarines are made obsolete by Japanese convoy and anti-submarine capability just like the Type VII was made obsolete in OTL by RN anti-submarine tactics and capability in may-June 1943.
So, in APOD, the USN will take the logical path, GUPPY for the submarines, HTP torpedoes, and passive engagement by salvo fire (which was their pre-war doctrine anyway!).
USN submarines cannot have snorkel in FTL or APOD. They use two-stroke diesels and the air volumes needed were too large, generating severe engineering problems which could not be solved until post-war (See john Alden, The Fleet Submarine in the US Navy: A Design and Construction History, USNIP, Annapolis, 1979, pp.131-132).
Regards: mark
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patzekiller
Inscrit le: 17 Oct 2006
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Localisation: I'am back
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| Posté le: Sam Aoû 14, 2010 10:29 Sujet du message: |
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These reinforcements will help relieve Guadalcanal?
These reinforcements will reduce the pressure vs Guadalcanal?
macrocephalic : a fleet whith lot of big units BB, CV...) but only few little units (CL, DD...)
I mean : will the IJN become this sort of fleet if more little units go to indonesia zone for escort convoy or hunter-killer missions
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delta force
Inscrit le: 07 Juin 2009
Messages: 580
Localisation: france Gironde
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| Posté le: Sam Aoû 14, 2010 11:15 Sujet du message: |
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le sujet est en en train de dériver par rapport au thème initial du post....
Quoiqu'il en soit Mark je ne suis pas convaincu.
Notamment sur un fait : pourquoi baser l'essentiel de l'IJN à Kuching si le flot des pétroliers est suffisant et les communications navales sûres ? Dans ce cas là autant mettre la flotte au plus près des zones d'opérations à savoir Truk ou Rabaul...
si l'hypothèse Kuching/ Indes néerlandaises est retenu FTL cela veut bien dire qu'il y a un problème de ravitaillement.
Compte tenu de tous les flux logistiques nécessaires à entretenir pour le soutien aux opérations (soutien de la ligne de sécurité extérieure, Chine ) il va falloir développer la flotte marchande japonaise qui est déjà insuffisante OTL et tous les soutiens associés (escortes).
Donc tension inévitalbe sur les ressources
- en main d'oeuvre
- en matières premières (acier notamment),
- et en moteurs,
Compte tenu de la capacité industrielle du japon il me semble impossible (comme OTL) que le Japon ait les moyens d'une guerre longue et sur des distances aussi considérables.
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marklbailey
Inscrit le: 05 Jan 2008
Messages: 121
Localisation: Canberra, Australia
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| Posté le: Sam Aoû 14, 2010 12:54 Sujet du message: |
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patzekiller
Thank you for the clarification.
Guadalcanal (at least in APOD, I will not speak for FTL) will shut down after December 1942 except for the evacuation of Japanese forces as they are defeated. Neither side can sustain an active theatre in the Solomons - recall that we were, in FTL, suing the 15:85 ratio of US resources Pacific:Europe. This makes the Japanese RELATIVELY twice as strong as OTL.
This means that the USA can support either the island hopping campaign, or the thrust up the Solomons chain, but not both.
The USA has to build up for its push into the Marshalls and will take 9-12 months to absorb all the lessons it has learned.
Meanwhile, the Japanese, knowing that the USN has been stopped (at very heavy cost to the IJN) must turn west to try and deal with the Empire in the Indian Ocean, while simultaneously building up for further clashes with the USN in the fourth quarter of 1943.
macrocephalic: not in APOD. Again I cannot speak for FTL. The Japanese were and remain very good intellects, able to respond quickly to military and economic drivers. Their kaibokan program used relatively few critical resources, these were cheap and efficient ships just like the Royal Navy's escorts.
The IJN simply cannot build many major warships anyway, and in both 'old FTL' and APOD we have drastically cut numbers of the most expensive warship types, large submarines. Thay 'pays' for the kaibokan program (large submarines cost 5-10 times more per ton than a simple escort, and demand extremely skilled workers), gives the IJN a strategic weakness in 1944-45.
The big program os simple, small submarines using production lines and semi-skilled workers does not compensate for the cancelaltion of the big submarine programs.
What will really limit them is steel production. In APOD, this will be about 25-33% ahead of OTL. In APOD, this permits two Taiho class carriers to be built, and a smaller Unryu class program (although it will actually deliver more ships than in OTL into service) plus two Ibuki class CA (fitted with 15 x 155mm guns from storage), a modest emergency DD type (Jacques idea, and a good one), a modest number of tanks for the army, and a merchant ship program. Again, what you do in FTL is none of my affair.
DF
| Citation: | | Anyway Mark I am not convinced. |
I have no intention of convincing anyone about anything in FTL. My comments relate to answering questions of historical fact, or to occurrences and progarms in APOD.
| Citation: | | Notamment sur un fait : pourquoi baser l'essentiel de l'IJN à Kuching si le flot des pétroliers est suffisant et les communications navales sûres ? Especially on a fact: why base the bulk of the IJN in Kuching if the flow of oil is sufficient and naval communications secure? |
The bulk of the IJN is not and cannot be based in Kuching. That is where Second Fleet has to be based - there is nowhere else to base it except Syonan (Singapore) which does not fall until September 1942.
| Citation: | | Dans ce cas là autant mettre la flotte au plus près des zones d'opérations à savoir Truk ou Rabaul... In this case however, putting the fleet closer to the areas of operations namely Truk or Rabaul ... |
That is NOT Second Fleet's Area of Operations (AO). That is Southern Area Fleet.
As the FTL and APOD chrono's show, Southern Area Fleet is reinforced by First Air Fleet and then, when it is damaged and forced to return to Japan for repairs, by the battleship force from Combined Fleet in mid 1942.
| Citation: | | si l'hypothèse Kuching/ Indes néerlandaises est retenu FTL cela veut bien dire qu'il ya un problème de ravitaillement. if the hypothesis Kuching / Indies FTL is selected it does mean that there is a problem of supply. |
Not fully understood. if you have assumed that Combined Fleet is based at Kuching, this assumption is not correct. There is a need to supply ARMY. Navy's demands are much less, especially if there is a local fuel supply. And wil undamaged or lightly danaged refineries physically located at the Second Fleet advanced base, why would they not get them in service quickly?
| Citation: | | Compte tenu de tous les flux logistiques nécessaires à entretenir pour le soutien aux opérations (soutien de la ligne de sécurité extérieure, Chine ) il va falloir développer la flotte marchande japonaise qui est déjà insuffisante OTL et tous les soutiens associés (escortes). Given all the flows necessary to maintain logistical support for operations (support line external security, China) we will have to develop the Japanese merchant fleet which is already insufficient OTL and all associated support (escorts). |
Correct as per OTL in 1943. It forces the Japanese to make hard choices just as in OTL. In APOD they will build the single-purpose shipyards as they did in OTL, build a lot of escorts first (as they did in OTL, but later), defeat the USN submarine offensive (unlike OTL) have adequate merchant ships for a time, and then get annihilated by a combination of huge USN carrier battle groups in 1944 and advanced USN GUPPY 1 type submarines.
What is done in FTL is entirely up to the European team. I only caution against having too many IJN losses too early for story reasons, as this may make 1944-45 extremely difficult to do realistically.
| Citation: | Donc tension inévitalbe sur les ressources So voltage inévitalbe Resources
- en main d'oeuvre - In labor
- en matières premières (acier notamment), - Raw materials (including steel)
- et en moteurs, - And motors, |
Yes, all per OTL. Look at:
USSBS reports on Japanese labour use 1941-45
The reports mentioned in an earlier post
USSBS reports on heavy industry and steel production
And USN techical reports on Japanese engines (see USN Technical Mission to Japan S-42 'Japanese Navy Diesel Engines' December 1945, and S-01-2 Characteristics of Japanese Naval Vessels Article 2 Surface warship machinery Design' etc etc. There is a LOT of information on these topics. Go to the Fischer-tropsch Archive online for this information.
| Citation: | | Compte tenu de la capacité industrielle du japon il me semble impossible (comme OTL) que le Japon ait les moyens d'une guerre longue et sur des distances aussi considérables. Given the industrial capacity of Japan it seems impossible (as OTL) that Japan has the means of a long war over distances as great. |
Correct. This is as per OTL. They were, in their eyes, forced to choose between two dreadful choices, national destruction through being forced to obey US will, or national destruction by fighting the USA.
They chose the second, because at least it seemed to give them a faint chance of a miracle.
They were fools.
What they did not know was that the Allies eventually had a definition of 'national destruction' which was beyond their worst nightmares in 1941.
They got exactly what they deserved, for making the choice they did. Being forced to curb their aggression in China was NOT the 'national destruction' they claimed - it was little more than restraining their own barbarity.
Regards: Mark
Edited for spelling and clarity. |
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